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Introduction 
Supervision is of fundamental importance to the
operation of any sector in the economy and can be
interpreted in many ways. Specifically, in regard to
banking, its primary justification is to limit the risk of
loss by depositors and thereby maintain confidence in
the financial system.The former is known as “conduct
of business regulation” and the latter “prudential
supervision”. Conduct of business regulation focuses
on the protection of the consumer. Its objective is to
set down guidelines and rules of acceptable behaviour
and business practices between banking institutions
and their customers. It deals with unsolicited contact,
advertising,complaints and,in some jurisdictions,lev-
els of service provision and profitability in order to
facilitate innovation and efficiency. On the other
hand, prudential supervision focuses on the factors
that are essential to the stability and well being of the
banking system and recognises that banks can inhibit
growth in the economy (Cetorelli and Gambera 2001)
and channel credit to its most pareto efficient condi-
tion (Goldsmith 1969). Issues such as liquidity provi-
sion, licensing and ownership control, risk manage-
ment requirements and entry restrictions are all mat-
ters which must be regulated in order to maintain sta-
bility. Its aim is to minimise the possibility of a break-
down in the financial sector and prevent any adverse
effects on long-term growth in the economy.
However, banking supervision has real costs
attached to its provision for financial institutions,
customers and governing institutions alike. There-
fore, its supervisory framework must endeavour to
strike the right balance between regulation and mar-
ket efficiency in order to ensure stability and pro-
mote competition.This paper investigates the extent
to which the current supervisory framework in
Ireland achieves this objective.
Irish banking regulatory environment
In 2003 the Central Bank and Financial Services
Authority of Ireland Act mapped the institutional
arrangement of supervision in Irish banking. This
Act created a single financial regulator, called the
Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority
(IFSRA).IFSRA operates within the newly formed
Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of
Ireland (CBFSAI) while still maintaining its inde-
pendence. In line with good practice, it was given a
dual mandate to protect consumer interest and to
build up a regulatory framework that protects the
stability of the banking sector. The newly created
institutional arrangement, through a process of
both horizontal and vertical integration1 (Figure),
fused together all conduct of business and pruden-
tial supervisory practices in financial services. Its
main objective is to achieve a balanced regulatory
framework with strong enforcement provisions.
Previous supervisory institutions were separated on
the basis of activity and type, which gave rise to a
complex and multifaceted matrix of regulatory
processes and entities.
Irish banking regulatory approach
IFSRA has initiated a principles-led and risk-based
approach to regulation, in accordance with interna-
tional best practice and the Irish Government’s
Better Regulation principles of necessity, effective-
ness, proportionality, transparency, accountability
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and consistency (Department of the Taoiseach 2004)
since its inception in 2003. Risk is incorporated
under a number of general and specific headings,
inter alia: supervisory complexity, structure, corpo-
rate governance,capital,contagion and related party
transactions, business risk, regulatory risk, opera-
tional risk and foreign exchange risk (IFSRA 2007).
This quasi-laissez faire approach to supervision is
concerned with setting desirable regulatory out-
comes and working with banks in deciding how best
to align their corporate objectives with the pre-
defined regulatory outcomes. This approach allows
banks to determine the compliance provisions on
each regulatory principle and provides the basis for
the efficient allocation of IFRSA`s supervisory
resources. Allocation is kept under constant review
through the publication of strategic plans which are
prepared every two years. Internal evaluation sys-
tems are benchmarked against international best
practice and some progress on the evaluation of
existing regulations has been made with the comple-
tion of two regulatory impact assessments along the
lines of the suggested PIER model (O’Sullivan and
Kennedy 2007). Finally, “in seeking to implement
rules to the minimum extent necessary” (IFSRA
2007), IFRSA has retained some elements of the
rules-based approach in order to protect customer’s
interests in regard to European Market Directives
on market abuse and collective investment schemes
(IFSRA 2007).
Critical appraisal of the Irish banking supervisory
framework
In undertaking a critical appraisal of the Irish bank-
ing supervisory framework, this paper focuses on
the contribution of IFRSA as the supervisory
authority in achieving market stability and promot-
ing market competition. Stability in the banking
sector is critical in ensuring that
the banking system can provide
sufficient credit and related ser-
vices to support business and
consumer spending, whilst com-
petition is necessary to ensure
that these are available at af-
fordable prices. In reviewing
these issues, one has to recog-
nise the international nature of
the banking system and the ex-
posure of the Irish economy to
the global credit crisis.
Stability of the Irish banking system
Financial turbulence in the latter half of 2007 posed
significant problems for financial regulators across
the globe and tested the robustness of their regula-
tory provisions. Although Irish banks have negligi-
ble exposure to the sub-prime sector (Central Bank
2008),credit constraints in the inter-bank European
money market posed a considerable threat to short-
term liquidity.While much of the difficulties associ-
ated with the 2007 credit crisis in Ireland were mit-
igated by strong inflows of external investment
funds into the economy, IFRSA took a number of
proactive steps which had a significant impact on
Irish banking. This resulted in the introduction of
new liquidity requirements with cash flows assigned
to relevant time bands rather than the previous
stock approach. It meant that banks had to in-
corporate higher capital requirements for specula-
tive land development proposals, amend their loan
to value mortgage thresholds and stress test at
2.75 percent above ECB rates (IFSRA 2008). In
effect, they were tested in the face of a variety of
extreme but plausible hypothetical shocks (Kearns
2004). They also had to provide the resources nec-
essary to deal with much closer engagement with
IFRSA in the form of daily monitoring, onsite-vis-
its and senior management level discussions and be
in a position to review their contingency plans and
internal governance and risk management struc-
tures. In developing this new supervisory frame-
work, IFRSA took into account international best
practice, the Basel guidelines, liquidity structures in
banks and consulted with consumer panels in
applying its principles-led approach.
The net result of this comprehensive multi-strategy
approach was a successful weathering by Irish banks
of the turbulent financial markets in 2007.According


























Figureto the Central Bank (2007; 2008), the Irish banking
sector remains well capitalised with all banking insti-
tutions reporting a solvency ratio well in excess of
the minimum 8 percent regulatory requirements in
2007.The liquidity position of the Irish banking sec-
tor is also above regulatory requirements and has
remained constant since 2001. Profit margins have
increased from 52.6 percent in 2005 to 57.3 percent
in 2007. Return on assets (ROA) was stable at an
acceptable range of between 1.01–1.03 percent and
reflects the shift in increased profit margins offset by
lower asset utilisation in 2007.Asset quality remains
high by historical standards with non-performing
assets to outstanding loans at 0.94 percent in 2007, a
slight increase on previous years.Recent suggestions
are that this figure could reach 3 percent in 2009.
Funding is stable, with the value of private sector
deposits within Irish credit institutions at 60.4 per-
cent of the value of private sector loans in 2007.
Benchmarked against best practice, historical trends
and international comparisons, the banking sector
appears resilient against deep credit and liquidity
shocks with risks such as exchange rate, interest rate
and equity risks having negligible effect (Central
Bank 2008). In contrast, Ireland’s exposure to the
building boom has resulted in market sentiment,
nationally and internationally, reducing the market
valuation of Irish banks by over three times its pre-
vious level in the last year. Therefore, the challenge
for IFRSA is to convince the market that the under-
lying fundamental operating performance of the
Irish banking sector merits a significant revaluation
of its market valuation and that its financial stability
is ensured.
Competition
IFRSA sees “the fostering of an international com-
petitive banking industry in Ireland” as one of its
three main responsibilities (IFSRA 2008). Enhancing
competition in the banking sector is said to increase
internal efficiency (Casu and Molyneux 2003)2 and
represents an overall positive externality for the econ-
omy (Claessens and Laeven 2004). Improved compe-
tition impacts conduct of business regulation, as
incumbent banks improve the quality and availability
of services and products to customers as they compete
for market share (Geroski, Gilbert and Jacquemin
1990). However, regulators in the past have been
sceptical towards competition, seeing it as having a
destabilising impact on the sector. Canoy, van Dijk,
Lemmen, de Mooij and Weigand (2001) suggest that
intensified competition forces banks to engage in
riskier operations in order to compensate for the ero-
sion in their profit margins. Amable, Chatelain and
Bandt (1998) document the relationship between an
increase in competitive efficiency for deposits and
credit and the probability of bank failures. However
recent contributions to the debate between competi-
tion and stability indicate that the relationship is
much more complex (Carletti 2008). In reviewing the
Netherlands financial system, Canoy et al. (2001) po-
sit the notion that gradual entry and effective pruden-
tial regulation can tackle most of the destabilising
effects of competition. Matutes and Vives (1996) also
show that competition does not necessarily create
instability.They suggest that the stability of the bank-
ing system is mainly due to “a coordination problem
faced by depositors that generate multiple equilibria
some of which imply the collapse of single entities or
even of the whole banking system.” O’Sullivan and
Kennedy (2007) outline the positive impact of the
entry of Bank of Scotland to the mortgage market in
Ireland in 1999 with no real impact on stability.
Rather, their entry was a stimulus for the incumbent
operators to become more competitive and to re-
engineer their operational structures.
While a dichotomy remains in the literature regard-
ing competition and stability, there is less argument
between competition (or a lack of) and efficiency.
Although Shaffer (1993; 2004) and Shaffer and
DiSalvo (1994) provides empirical research of high-
ly competitive concentrated banking markets, most
documented evidence points to the premise that
highly concentrated banking systems damage effi-
ciency levels in the banking sector. For example,
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) suggest that low lev-
els of competition have been found to depress indus-
trial growth as it positively influences profitability,
resulting in higher loan pricing and lower deposit
rates. It can, also, lead to price leadership or some
form of general inter-bank collusion, implicit or
explicit (Davy Stockbrokers 2003). According to
Berger, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Haubrich
(2004) it can result in inefficiencies such as excess
capacity.These overall findings are consistent with a
number of empirical studies (Altunbas, Gardener,
Molyneux and Moore 2001), which estimate that
inefficiencies resulting from concentration in the
European banking system account for between
20 and 30 percent of banks total operating costs.
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In testing the level of competition in Irish banking,
the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index provides a
useful barometer in determining the degree of mar-
ket power exercised in a particular industry (Bikker
2004). It is calculated by squaring the market share
of each firm competing in a market, and then sum-
ming the resulting numbers. It is defined as:
where MSi is the market share of the ith firm and N
is the number of firms.
It is commonly used by regulators when evaluating the
effects of mergers and acquisitions in particular indus-
tries. The HH index number can range from close
to zero to 10,000.The US Department of Justice3 con-
siders a market with a result of less than 1,000 to be a
competitive marketplace; a result of 1,000–1,800 to be
a moderately concentrated marketplace; and a result
of 1,800 or greater to be a highly concentrated mar-
ketplace. By extrapolating from IFSRA data in the
period 2002 to 2007, we were able to estimate the HH
index in the banking industry in Ireland.
The result indicates a highly concentrated banking
industry with an overall HH index of 2,193 in 2007,
compared with 2,179 in 2002. Significantly, credit
cards and current accounts, two of the main drivers
for banking in the financial system, have the highest
indices at 2,603 and 2,481,respectively.These finding
are supported by research conducted in 2004, high-
lighting that between 75 percent and 90 percent of
all current accounts were controlled by two of the
largest banks in Ireland (AIB and Bank of Ireland;
Competition Authority 2004) with the two same
banks also accounting for 30 percent of the entire
range of banking activities in Ireland (Compecon
2004). In addition, the Competition Authority (2004)
identified continued anti-competitive practices in
regard to personal current accounts, small business
lending and the operation of the payments clearing
system. This is supported by Standard & Poor’s in
2006 indicating that AIB and Bank of Ireland control
more that 40 percent of loans and deposits and
together have almost 80 percent of the personal cur-
rent account market. These conditions allowed Irish
Banks to be the most profitable in the world during
the Celtic Tiger with pre-tax operating margins in the
range of between 50–60 percent versus comparable
figures in the US of 32 percent, Britain 35 percent
and Australia 37 percent (Standard and Poor’s 2006).
The increase in concentration experienced in the Irish
banking system in the 2000s took place against a back-
drop of a rapidly expanding economy. Seminal
research (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990, Kuznets
1955, Townsend 1973) concludes that intensive eco-
nomic growth should stimulate further competition in
banking, inducing new entry, innovation and efficien-
cy, making markets more competitive and reducing
concentration levels. However, despite all the institu-
tional and regulatory changes which have occurred,
the Irish banking system still exhibits market concen-
tration,asymmetries of information (between banking
institutions), cross subsidisation and strategic barriers
to entry.Much of the initiatives which have been intro-
duced to liberalise the Irish banking system have been
initiated on a pan-European level and not domestical-
ly driven, such as the Second Banking Directive of
1988 and the attendant Own Funds and Solvency
Ratio Directives. The operation of the Irish Payment
Clearing System is an example of anti-competitive
practice (Compecon 2004) and reflects a narrow mar-
ket equilibrium perspective instead of the more ap-
propriate general equilibrium perspective. In Ireland,
membership of the payment clearing system is con-
trolled and funded directly by the members.An inde-
pendent report commissioned by the UK Chancellor
of the Exchequer in March 2000 found that the control
of the payment clearing system by its members was
damaging to competition. Further, in order to join the
system, a firm must pay a sunk cost to cover the his-
toric development cost, which is seen as an efficacious
barrier to entry (Schmalensee 2004). According to
Calomiris, Kahn and Kroszner (1996) economists and
regulators have long raised concerns about the poten-
tial anti-competitive implications of powerful private
payments networks. Some progress has been made in
this area in recent years with the entry of Bank of
Scotland in September 2005. Much more deregulation
of the system is, however, required, as recommended
by the Competition Authority (2004; O’Sullivan and
Kennedy 2007). Compecon (2004), estimate that the
elimination of further restrictions on competition in
the Irish banking system would add between 0.33 and
0.5 percent to GDP.
Challenges facing IFRSA
Despite the positive overall conclusion on the stabil-
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http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.htm.must now deal with a very different economic land-
scape and respond to the criticism that it was not
proactive enough during the “Celtic tiger” boom in
Ireland (1997–2006). During that time, the Irish
banking sector adopted a number of aggressive
strategies that resulted in a sharp increase in private
sector indebtedness and gave rise to a significant
increase in their profitability (Standard and Poor
2008). It offered 100 percent mortgages to first time
buyers without occupational restrictions, interest
only mortgages, fewer restrictions on overdrafts and
other credit products propagated throughout bank-
ing. However, since mid-2007, the environment has
changed dramatically. The current Irish official
growth target forecasts4 for 2008 is at best 0.5 per-
cent versus an average growth rate of 7 percent per
annum for the past decade (Department of Finance
2008). The Economic and Social Research Institute
(2008) believes that Ireland will experience a reces-
sion5 in 2008; it’s first in over a quarter of a century.
Inflation has risen to 5 percent with unemployment
at 5.7 percent (CSO 2008), the highest rate since
1998. Domestic demand is set to contract sharply in
2008 (Central Bank 2008) reflecting the lowest level
of consumer confidence that the Irish economy has
seen for some years (ERSI/ IIB 2008). Specific to
banking, property has declined by 7.3 percent in the
year to May 2007 leading to negative equity con-
cerns (permanent TSB /ESRI 2008). House prices
have dropped by 25 percent since the height of the
housing boom in 2005 (Friends First 2008) and are
set to drop within the range of between 20–30 per-
cent over the course of the next few years (Credit
Suisse 2008). Construction output has contracted
each month since June 2007 (Ulster Bank 2008) with
only 29,000 housing built in the year end March 2008
compared to 63,000 the previous year.
The residual effect of the credit-crunch driven eco-
nomic downturn on the banking system is deter-
mined by its high exposure, like the USA and Spain,
to the construction sector and evidenced by a sharp
increase in loan defaults and increased private sector
indebtedness. Credit Suisse (2008) estimate that
Irish banks face billions of euros of bad-debt losses
as borrowers default on mortgage and commercial
property loans amid falling house prices and rising
unemployment figures. Recent statistics show a 50
percent increase in possession applications and
mortgage lawsuits between 2006 and 2007 (Court
Services 2008). Specialist mortgage providers such
as Start Mortgages, who offered credit to the sub-
prime market, brought 171 suits before the court in
2007 versus 116 applications for the entire banking
industry in 2003. As regards private sector indebt-
edness, MFI lending to domestic households in
August 2007 was 77.8 percent of GDP, making Ire-
land the third most indebted country in the EU and
projected to be the highest amongst OECD coun-
tries by the Central Bank (2008).Standard & Poor’s
add to the doom and gloom scenario by starting
that “the heavily-indebted nature of Ireland’s pri-
vate sector poses significant risks over and above
that of a construction sector slowdown”. However,
the situation must be viewed in the context of the
very significant growth in the Irish banking sector,
particularly in the last decade, and the fact that the
previously low levels of default were unsustainable
in the long term.The challenge for IFRSA is to pru-
dently manage the new environment and ensure
that the appropriate level of credit is available to
fuel economic activity.
Another strategic challenge facing IFRSA is to
increase its supervision and competence in monitor-
ing, rating and validating trades and financial prod-
ucts in the securities market. Significant resources
are currently being developed towards building a
new transaction reporting system consistent with
international best practice (IFSRA 2008). This is
expected to go live in October 2008, with obvious
impact on market confidence. Inline with EU re-
quirements, IFRSA needs to end the current dele-
gated role of the Irish Stock Exchange in the ap-
proval of the prospectus documents and ensure com-
pliance with the 2007 Consumer Protection Code.
This conduct of business code is a “legally binding
document comprising of a set of general principles
supplemented by more detailed rules, which regulat-
ed financial service providers must adhere to when
providing financial services to consumers” (IFRSA
2008). It is mandatory and carries with it sanctions
up to  5 million.It will deal with the recent high pro-
file cases of the mis-selling of financial products to
the elderly raised by the Financial Services
Ombudsman.
Conclusions and recommendations 
While in reality, the European Community shapes
and forms much of the regulatory regime in Ireland,
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discretion in relation to implementation allows the
Irish regulator (IFRSA) scope to pursue its guiding
principles and set the tone of regulatory supervision
in Ireland. IFRSA has taken the progressive step in
pursuing the principle-led approach to regulation
and the current institutional arrangements adopted
are highly effective in managing the large macro-
economic perspectives. Consequently, the funda-
mentals in Irish banking remain positive, with the
capitalisation and liquidity position of banks in
excess of regulatory requirements (Central Bank
2008). Therefore, the Irish banking sector is well
capable of meeting the challenges presented by the
sub-prime crisis and, given the adoption of prudent
fiscal measures by the Irish government, well posi-
tioned to capitalise on the recovery anticipated in
the next 12 to 18 months.
However, significant failures have been highlighted
in this paper and they need to be addressed.The high
levels of concentration within the Irish banking sys-
tem pose a major constraint to future economic
growth and development.In addition,the high levels
of private sector indebtedness, within the prevailing
economic conditions needs to be carefully managed
and the banking sector needs to adopt a flexible
approach, on a case by case basis. IFRSA needs to
undertake a detailed study determining the amount
of default risk present within the Irish banking sec-
tor,as a basis for facilitating a measured approach to
its resolution. IFRSA needs to show leadership in
facilitating competition, restructuring the payment
system and communicating better with the general
public, particularly in regard to personal indebted-
ness. Finally, it should expand its application of the
Regulation Impact Assessment technique (O’Sulli-
van and Kennedy 2007) to appraise its current struc-
tural and regulatory provisions.
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